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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyse the economic efficiency of electronic money and 
to identify different factors hindering its growth. It is argued that electronic money might 
eventually make paper money obsolete. Nevertheless, prospects for the development of this 
monetary innovation remain uncertain due to the complexity and ambiguity of electronic 
money products. In particular, the paper identifies network effects and habit persistence 
as major factors hindering the adoption and more widespread use of electronic money.
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Around the world, entrepreneurs and institutions are racing to develop ef-
fective means of exchange for transaction across the internet and World Wide 
Web. Their aim is to create units of purchasing power that are fully usable and 
transferable electronically: ’virtual’ money that can be employed as easily as 
conventional currencies to acquire real goods and services. The era of electro-
nic money will be soon upon us.
(Cohen. B.J, The Future of Money, 2004)
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1 Introduction 
The last decade of the 20th century was a prosperous decade economically, characte-
rised by significant advances in technological innovation and adaptation and their appli-
cation in all socioeconomic activities. Some observers argue about a move toward a new 
economic era - a knowledge-based economy or a digital economy- which might lead to a 
third industrial revolution comparable to the first represented by the development of spin-
ning machinery and the steam engine in the late 18th and the second characterised by the 
development of electricity and railroads in the late 19th century (Mokyr, 1999).
The last decade of the 20th century was also marked by rapidly decreasing costs and 
improvements in performance of computing and telecommunications. As a result, the com-
puter is becoming omnipresent: most offices use computers for managing their internal and 
external activities, and more and more households are becoming connected to the Internet 
and other networks. This development has encouraged commercial activity over the Inter-
net and allowed a larger variety of assets to be exchanged electronically. It has also led to 
the development of some new forms of assets. The new form of “money” that has received 
most attention around the world is called “e-money products”. This term refers to pre-pay-
ment systems in the real and the virtual worlds whose purpose is to enhance the effective-
ness of existent payment systems and replace cash and coins in retail transactions.
Actually, there is no universal definition of e-money. The Bank for International Set-
tlements (BIS, 1996:1) affirms that electronic money is difficult to define because it com-
bines specifics technological and economic characteristics. In addition, various e-money 
schemes are being developed and they differ considerably in their features, their techni-
cal implementation, and in the way in which value is transferred. (ibid., 2). As a result, se-
veral definitions of electronic money have evolved over time (Baddeley, 2004). In 1998, 
the ECB defined electronic money as “an electronic store of monetary value on a techni-
cal device that may be widely used for making payments to undertakings other than the 
issuer without necessarily involving bank accounts in the transaction, but acting as a pre-
paid bearer instrument” (ECB, 1998:7).
Despite the strong interest worldwide in e-money, the adoption of this monetary in-
novation is still in its primary stage. It has not been in widespread use so far either in the 
European Union or in other industrial countries. Cash remains the dominant means of pa-
yment especially in small-value retail payments and everyday retail transactions. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the economic aspects of e-money and to identi-
fy factors which might hinder its growth. The existing literature on the development of 
e-money is limited. For instance Hymphery et al. (2001) and Stavins (2001) explain the 
problem of e-money development from the supply side. They argue that the slow adopti-
on of electronic payment systems such as e-money is due to high fixed costs, which req-
uire large up-front investment on the part of merchants. Some others contributors explain 
the problem facing e-money development from the demand side (Stavins, 1997; Bounie 
and Abel, 2006). They argue that the use of electronic payment systems requires many 
preconditions, such as a relatively high level of income and education, which are not ne-
cessary for the use of other payment instruments.
The main contribution of this paper is to argue that the adoption and use of electro-
nic money products also depend on two other factors. The first one is network externa-295
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lities and the two-sided (adoption and use) nature of the market for the use of electronic 
money. The second one is the “the habit problem”, a psychological factor related to so-
called path dependency in the development and use of electronic money. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The first section describes the evolution 
of electronic forms of payment (e-money) and analyses their economic efficiency. The se-
cond section examines barriers hindering the more widespread use of electronic money, in-
cluding network effects and habit persistence. The conclusion summarises the findings.
2 ICT revolution and money innovation 
Electronic money is not a new phenomenon. Since the Information and Computing 
Technology (ICT) revolution in the middle of the nineties, the falling cost of computing 
and semiconductors and the growth of internationally interconnected computer networks, 
the majority of payments are becoming electronic. Commerce over the Internet is incre-
asing the use of these new technologies and consequently, the demand for a new electro-
nic payment system is enhanced.
However, the electronic transfer of payments in retail financial transactions and the 
use of the Internet as a monetary marketplace are relatively new. As a result, the geogra-
phy of money has changed (Cohen, 1998). Due to the ICT revolution, a new form of elec-
tronic payments appeared and quickly received considerable attention around the world 
and we talk about electronic money products (also known as electronic cash, e-purse, e-
currency, digital currency, digital money, scrip or digital cash). Money has information 
stored in a microprocessor or on a computer database which allow data, including acco-
unt balances, personal information, PIN codes, shopping information and loyalty rewards 
to be stored on the card. The purpose is incontestably to enhance and to improve the ef-
ficiency of traditional payments systems.
2.1 The evolution of the electronic payment system 
Electronic payment systems have existed since the sixties of the last century with the 
invention of the Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) which has grown in number and sophi-
stication around the world (see Table 1). EFT implies the application of computer and te-
lecommunication technology in making or processing payments. Generally this system 
was used by banks and other financial institutions to exchange and to transfer large amo-
unts of money at national and international levels.
The essence of EFT is to make money move via networks as a substitute for cash or 
cheques to conduct transactions; the purpose is also to save time and to reduce transacti-
on costs. The use of EFT became widespread with the introduction and acceptance of au-
tomated teller machines (ATMs) which enable direct fund transfers at points of sale (EF-
TPOS). The EFT is considered the first step of payment electronification.
In the early 1980s, thanks to the development of network technologies and the falling 
costs of telecom and data processing, electronic payments became even more useful with 
the appearance of credit and debit card payment technology. Some years after its inven-
tion, this became the most popular electronic instrument for making retail payments. The 
development of encryption played a major role in the success of the card-payment system. 
This innovation was considered the second step of payment electronification. 296
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Table 1 Evolution of the number of terminals (thousands, end of year)
ATMs POS terminals
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Canada 35.6 40.0 44.2 48.5 52.7 463.2 494.9 520.6 546.0 571.4
France 36.9 39.0 42.0 43.7 47.8 904.3 956.4 1000.0 1060.0 1095.0
Germany 49.6 50.5 51.1 52.6 53.4 435.7 460.6 495.8 520.0 569.5
Italy  36.6 39.6 39.1 39.7 40.6 774.7 847.5 928.0 1.007.5 1045.0
Netherland  7.1 7.5 7.6 7.9 7.5 165.8 177.2 186.3 195.0 206.4
Sweden 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.8 88.2 102.0 108.1 161.1 176.6
Switzerland 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.6 73.9 80.7 80.0 88.1 110.2
UK 36.7 40.8 46.5 54.4 58.3 772.0 810.6 861.3 920.0 974.1
Source: BIS, 2006
The rise and acceptance of card payment had a negative repercussion on the tradi-
tional payment system. There was a transition from paper-based instruments, in parti-
cular cheques and cash, to electronic-based instruments in many countries. For the first 
time ever, payments with cheques decreased as a proportion of the total transactions in 
a lot of countries. As Table 2 shows, cheques (as the popular instrument for payments) 
lost their market share and are actually declining even in absolute volume. Some coun-
tries like the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium are already moving toward the cheq-
ue-less society. 
Table 2 Number of cheques per year and per capita in selected countries
1990 2004
France 80 66
UK 56 35
Belgium 21 2
Italy 15 8
Germany 10 1
Netherlands 17 0
Spain 7 5
Source: European Central Bank, 2005
2.2 The birth of e-money
Electronic money has a twofold origin. Firstly, according to Austrian economic ana-
lysis (Menger, 1982; Von Hayek, 1976; Centi, 1979, etc), money as a “social institution” 
is anyway subject to ongoing institutional change; it is interpreted as the fruit of a spon-
taneous evolution intended to cure the disadvantages of barter and the double coinciden-
ce of want. E-money is the most recent stage of this development and is a further instan-
ce of institutional change (Schmitz, 2001). TTS principal role is to stimulate electronic 297
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trade over the World Wide Web, facilitate transactions, reduce their costs and finally to 
substitute for coins and bills in small sums, i.e., in the retail payments. The second ori-
gin of e-money is related to the ICT revolution characterized by the integration of infor-
mation processing and telecommunications technologies and the increase of the geogra-
phical distance over which information can be transmitted and spread among the public 
and around the world. ICT has modified the financial sector and is making payment sy-
stems more reliable and effective, giving the birth to a new monetary intermediary circu-
lating through networks. 
ICT is a typical revolution but e-money is not, it is simply a new way of processing 
information and storing purchasing power. According to White (1996), the various finan-
cial innovations do not create new forms of money, but are rather new ways of employing 
existing money in transactions. Despite the consequences of the technological boom, the 
nature of money is still the same, with its famous three functions2. The nature of money 
will never change and it will usually be only the intermediary by which goods and servi-
ces are exchanged. 
The e-money3 card is a new means of payment which makes it possible to transfer 
value from card to terminal or card to wallet electronically only, both in the physical world 
and via networks. This monetary innovation is seen as a fundamental achievement; it car-
ries a preloaded monetary value and can be used as a means of payment for multiple small-
value purchases. The purse contains a microprocessor in which information and moneta-
ry value are stored. It represents a technological advance on cards with magnetic stripes, 
and also includes higher level of security that can dramatically reduce fraud because chip 
cards are much more difficult to counterfeit than magnetic stripe cards. 
Table 3 Design features of e-money products in some countries 2004
Country Name of 
systems
Loading 
procedures
Transferability
among end
users
Adapted for
network
payment
Multifunctional
payment
features
Belgium Proton ATM,
phone,
internet
No No Yes (debit card
function and
ATM access)
Czech Republic FUNCHIP Terminal No No No
Denmark Danmøn ATM No No No
France Moneo ATM No No Yes (debit card
function)
Germany GeldKarte ATM No Yes Yes
Netherlands Chipknip Dedicated
loading device
No No > 70% issued on
debit card
Switzerland CASH ATM No No Yes
 Source: BIS (2004)
2 Money serves as a medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value.
3 E-money products need to be distinguished from the access products which generally allow consumers to use 
electronic means of communication to access conventional payment services.298
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The first e-money card, named Danmøn, was created by Danish industrial enterprises 
in 1992. This experience was a success and since then a lot of countries around the world 
have been trying out different e-money card projects. As Table 3 shows, the functions and 
characteristics of an e-money card vary from one country to another.
2.3 Why e-money?
Cash has a lot of disadvantages. In addition cash holding costs are high and numero-
us – including retail transaction accounting, theft, loss of cash, safekeeping and security, 
deposit costs, as well as costs related to cash management services provided by financial 
institutions. In his criticism of cash, James Gleick argued that: “Cash is dirty … Cash is 
heavy … Cash is inequitable … Cash is quaint, technologically speaking … Cash is ex-
pensive … Cash is obsolete (Goodhart and Krueger, 2001). 
E-money aims at replacing cash for small transactions and eliminating its drawbacks. 
‘Moneo’4 is the name of the French experience in the e-money card. It was created in 
order to reduce these costs and to provide a new way of storing and transporting purcha-
sing power temporally. Moneo should facilitate a variety of low value retail transactions 
and should consequently be a substitute for real cash. It is a modern and rapid payment 
means; it will certainly be of great convenience for its users. 
Moneo provides numerous benefits to both consumers and merchants. Benefits to 
consumers include convenience, speed and possible rewards, such as discounts on fu-
ture purchases, obviation of the need to have the correct change for a transaction or to 
handle5 a lot small coins. The incidence of error in calculating change from transactions 
would also be reduced. Moneo owners might be able to carry fewer bank cards, especi-
ally if credit card and debit card functions are also included in the electronic purse card; 
owners will feel more secure, and solve the exact change problem (Gerald, 1996). Bene-
fits to merchants include receiving cash in advance of the delivery of goods and services, 
increased loyalty, potentially faster payment processing at the point of sale, and potenti-
ally lower payment processing costs. Note that if the benefit to the retailer is greater than 
the cost, the retailer may “pay” customers to purchase and use its prepaid card (Chakra-
vorti and Victor, 2006). 
Moneo has also a great advantage compared to other POS cards: while debit or cre-
dit cards are not efficient for micro-payment because the transaction related-cost is high 
for both consumer and merchant, electronic money can be use at a low cost. As table 4 
shows, payment with e-money is costless compared to other means of payment, notably 
debit and credit cards. Another argument in favour of the Moneo card is that the purse 
contains a new encryption technology that reinforces its security and limits fraud. In ad-
dition, payment with Moneo further reduces transaction costs since it does not require 
authorisation or customer identification. 
4 Moneo is available via disposable cards or reloadable chip cards issued by banks (e-money functionali-
ty built into a bank/credit card). Loading is possible via ATMs or via Internet using a PC software application and 
card reader.
5 There are opportunity costs of holding cash that rise with interest rate and inflation.299
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Table 4 Costs of different means of payment for holder and issuer (in $)
Means of payment Cost for issuer Cost for holder
Cheques 3.00 6.00
Credit card 0.80 2.50
Debit card 0.40 0.60
Cash 0.15 0.30
E-purse 0.07 0.07
Source: Mair,1999
The new technologies will enable people to acquire the goods they want without hol-
ding or handling cash, which is a troublesome, non-earning asset. In the future, trade will 
be executed by instantaneous and simultaneous debiting and crediting of liquid-wealth 
accounts, held by both banking and non-banking institutions. The new electronic digital-
payments technology will enable property-rights claims on real assets, such as stock and 
bond funds, or gold, to be utilized as the medium of exchange for virtually all transacti-
ons. (Rahn, 2000).
2.4 Payment with e-money and transaction costs
Carrying out payments on the classical money market requires at least one seller and 
one buyer, both in contact with banks interconnected via a clearing house. The final pay-
ment using a traditional instrument, like cheques or bank transfers, requires the interven-
tion of a third party called financial intermediaries such as banks. 
Payment with e-money reproduces the traditional scheme: that means the two actors 
and one or two banks. However, what is relatively new is that the transaction process 
is becoming easier and more efficient than payment with cash or other forms of pay-
ment. A transaction does not require any personal code and it may not exceed a defi-
ned amount. If the purchasing power of the chip is totally exhausted, the purse can be 
reloaded automatically at the merchant without any additional fees, thanks to the spe-
cial terminal POS. Once the chip is charged, the user does not incur travelling expen-
ses to look for money or lose time in providing the right change. In addition problems 
of theft or loss of money are reduced to the minimum. A transaction with e-money does 
not immediately need any intermediary because the money is transferred electronical-
ly as units (called bits) from the payer to the payee. When the amount of the consu-
mer transaction made with electronic purse is stored in the merchant’s terminal it will 
then be transferred to his account at a financial institution from time to time through 
on-line transactions. 
The particularity of payment with e-money is the fall in transaction cost and gain in 
time as compared to other forms of payment. Humphrey et al. (2003:172) estimate that 
“electronic money costs only from one-third to one-half as much as a paper-based pay-
ment. If a country moves from a wholly paper-based payment system to close to an all 
electronic system, it may save 1% or more of its GDP annually once the transition costs 
are absorbed”..300
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3 Barriers hindering the development of e-money 
When the e-money product was first introduced, it was hailed as the money of the 21st 
century due to its particularities and its advantages for consumers, merchants and finan-
cial institutions6. However, statistics on the adoption of electronic payment system reve-
al that the e-money product is still at a primary stage. According to the Blue Book of the 
ECB (2005), payments with pre-paid cards represents only 0.7% of the total of the scrip 
means of payment used in the Euro era7. This new money innovation has been not in wi-
despread use so far neither in the European Union nor in other industrial countries. Cash 
continues to be used as the most important single means of payment for the majority of 
households’ retail transactions.
Beyond the two reasons quoted at the top of the paper (the supply-side and the de-
mand-side), we argue that the use of electronic money products depends on two other fa-
ctors that explain its slow adoption. The first one is network externalities and the two-
sided market (adoption and use) and the second one is the psychological factor, notably 
the path dependency that we will call the habit problem.
3.1 Acceptability of e-money and networks effect
The extent of the spread of e-money will depend on the incentives for issuers, consu-
mers and merchants to use it (BIS, 1996:3).
• The demand by consumers for e-money will depend on how the schemes compa-
re with other payment methods in terms of the fees (if any) charged by issuers, the per-
ceived security and privacy of e-money, the ease with which the e-money devices can be 
used, and the willingness of merchants to accept e-money. 
• Potential incentives for issuers include the revenues from any fees charged to con-
sumers and merchants, revenues from the investment of the outstanding balances and, for 
bank issuers, cost savings from reduced cash handling (to the extent that e-money repla-
ces cash). Acting as a possible disincentive could be the cost of meeting any existing or 
expected future regulation.
• Merchants’ willingness to accept e-money will be related to the size of fees impo-
sed by the issuers or operators, the cost of terminals and the reduction in the cost to them 
of handling cash. As far as both consumers and merchants are concerned, a key factor 
will be their willingness to adopt new technology. Most observers seem to believe that 
the spread of e-money products will be moderate in the short and medium term but could 
become more extensive in the longer run.
According to those reasons, we perceive that the use of electronic money becomes 
complicated and fundamentally depends on the interaction between users of the same 
product or service. These complementarities may be an obstacle of the start up and gro-
wth of money innovation. 
6 Electronic means of payment are less costly to manage than cash or cheques (Hymphrey, 2001).
7 In opposition to the fiduciary money (constituted of the bills and coins), the scriptural means of payment (card, 
cheque, transfer, withdrawal, etc.) are devices which allow the transfer of funds held in accounts by credit institutions 
or comparable institutions (fund of the deposits and consignments, Treasury...) following the handing-over of a pay-
ment order. Scrip money is settled via inter-bank payment systems.301
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3.2 The economic theory of network externalities
According to Schmalensee (1995), a network can be defined as a set of nodes conne-
cted, directly or indirectly by a set of links. Schmalensee argue that a major feature of a 
network is the presence of network externalities. This concept is abundantly used in eco-
nomic literature; it is also of recurring interest in industrial organization and public eco-
nomics (Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Schamlensee, 1995; Economides, 1996). 
The term ‘network externality’ refers to the phenomenon whereby a service beco-
mes more valuable as more people use it, thereby encouraging ever-increasing num-
bers of adopters. (A significant part of the value of the product/network is the other 
participants of the network). This is also known as increasing returns to scale and a 
positive spiral. This effect is common in digital products, more specifically, products 
that benefit from the connectivity of the customer base. Telephones, fax machines and 
computer operating systems are examples. Its success is due to compatibility and con-
formity issues, not that the product or technology may be superior or inferior to the 
competition.
In discussing the Internet, the concept of network externalities has been popularized 
in a statement known as “Metcalfe’s Law”, which roughly claims that the value of a given 
network is proportional to the square of the number of its users8.
Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1986) provide early analyses of 
network externalities; they have classified it in two groups: direct and indirect network 
externalities. Direct network externalities exist when an increase in the size of a network 
increases the number of others with whom one can “communicate” directly. In this sort 
of network there is a kind of interaction and there are complementarities between users of 
the same product or service. Indirect network externalities exist when an increase in the 
size of a network expands the range of complementary products available to the mem-
bers of the network.
Network externalities introduce dynamic considerations for both users and producers 
(Klenow, 2002). For users, the adoption decision must take into account the size of the 
network in the future to avoid being stranded in an unpopular network. Firms have incen-
tives to invest in building proprietary networks from which they can earn rents.
Markets that experience network effects are prone to become more effective as more 
people join one network (product in the market) rather than having the market segmen-
ted with many proprietary networks (competitive market). Once network effects are esta-
blished, markets tend to tip, favouring the market leader at the expense of other products 
in the marketplace. 
3.3 Conditions for e-money use 
E-money is a typical network good and, as such, the impact of its introduction as a 
means of exchange can be analyzed through the concepts of network and the theory of 
network externalities (Arnone and Bandiera, 2004:6).
8 “Metcalfe’s Law” is named after Bob Metcalfe, the inventor of the Ethernet (Shapiro and Varian, 1999:184).302
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In economic theory, the utility of money increases proportionately to the number of 
people using it. In this sense money is like a telephone network: expanding the size of the 
network increases the value of using the telephone to the original subscribers. However 
an economic actor accepts using a new currency, such as e-money, if he has confidence 
in it and that this money is generally accepted by other people. The general acceptability 
of money is a fundamental criterion of its success; it explains the importance of this insti-
tution (money) in the economy. Therefore, it arises from the analysis of the determinants 
of money acceptance, that money may be used because an individual believes (anticipa-
tes) that others will use it. 
Krueger (1999) said that as long as the value of the money is not systematically and 
strongly reduced, it will be accepted. What makes money acceptable to an individual is 
the belief or the experience that it is also accepted by others. The anticipation factor is a 
crucial determinant of money acceptance, we can compare this conclusion to the bootstrap 
effect highlighted by Iwai (1997) “money is money because it is used as money”.
Menger (1892) said “When the relatively most saleable commodities have become 
‘money’ the event has in the first place the effect of substantially increasing their origi-
nally high saleableness. Every economic subject bringing less-saleable wares to market 
(...) has thenceforth a stronger interest in converting what he has in the first instance into 
wares which have become money” (Menger, 250).
Fiure 1 Factors influencing e-money development
Confidence
=
R_putation
Acceptability
=
Anticipation
Path 
dependency
=
Habit problem
Network
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Electronic
Money
Adoption
Critical
Mass
As the Figure 1 shows, acceptability, confidence and anticipation are fundamental 
factors that make the expansion of the network easier. But they are not sufficient, becau-
se the network size needs also an interdependency of demand, which means that the mar-
ket for a network good must reach a minimum size before a sustainable equilibrium can 303
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be achieved. Economides and Himmelberg (1995) call this minimum size the network’s 
“critical mass.” 9
3.4 Interdependency problem and critical mass paradox
Oliver et al. (1985) defined critical mass as a small segment of the population that 
chooses to make big contributions to the collective action while the majorities do little or 
nothing. Critical mass or the installed base of network facilities play an essential role in 
the start up and development of a network. 
The concept of critical mass formalizes the “chicken and the egg” paradox10: many 
consumers are not interested in purchasing the good because the installed base is too small, 
and the installed base is too small because an insufficiently large number of consumers 
have purchased the good. Thus, consumers’ expectations of no provision of a network 
good may be fulfilled. However, for a range of costs, expectations of positive level(s) of 
sales of the network good are also fulfilled. Often, there are multiple fulfilled expectation 
equilibriums. Consumers and producers can coordinate to reach any one of them (Econo-
mides and Himmelberg, 1995:7).
Electronic money cards, like other innovations that involve the creation of networks 
between the producers of services and their consumers, are said to provide network ex-
ternalities and need to accomplish a critical mass before the card can be used effective-
ly; this phenomenon is called in modern literature “two sided markets”. This interesting 
literature explains that the development of a payment instrument largely depends on two 
types of externalities related to adoption and use. Those conditions are essential because 
the average consumer’s benefit from using a money innovation in transactions depends 
on how many other consumers and businesses are using the same medium. In addition, 
the total benefit associated with the use of e-money cards exceeds the benefit accruing 
directly to an individual consumer. By extending the network, one person’s participation 
also increases the benefit to others. In this situation a Catch-22 dilemma arises from the 
introduction of a new payments instrument. A critical mass in the electronic money card 
market will be achieved when the demand interdependency between payer and payee is 
no longer economically significant and also when the consumer’s expected benefit from 
having an e-money card is not materially affected by the small increase in the number of 
consumers using it; but up to this stage (Osterberg and Thomson, 1998), there will be con-
siderable uncertainty among both consumers and merchants as to the potential usefulness 
of the product. Clearly, the benefits to consumers will rise as the new means of payment 
becomes acceptable to merchants, while the benefits to merchants will rise with greater 
usage by consumers. Second, the attractiveness of electronic purses to both consumers 
and retailers may be hindered by the presence of competing and incompatible systems, as 
was the case for videocassette recorders a number of years ago. 
9 Called also Catch-22 dilemma, chicken-and-egg-problem (no supply thus no demand, or no demand thus no 
supply). For more detail see Osterberg and Thomson (1998) and Oliver et al. (1985).
10 From another view point, this paradox may be also formalised as: if the merchant refuse to invest in a new 
system the use becomes weak, the request becomes vulnerable but also expensive for the consumer, see Katz and 
Shapiro (1986)304
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The externality consumption conducts to a complicated paradox which means that in-
vestors must invest colossal amounts of money in subsidising appliances and other costs 
of joining the network before they reach commercial practicality. Thus use and spread of 
electronic money as a network good is complex and ambiguous because interdependen-
ce of demand will remain an obstacle11 until the innovation achieves a critical mass, eit-
her in its own time or with the authorities’ help. According to Katz and Shapiro (1986) 
analysis, the growth of a network can be self-fulfilling in nature. In the payment area, the 
slow adoption of e-money schemes serves again as a good example.
3.5 The problem of habit persistence 
Is it easy to achieve a critical mass in the use of e-money? The answer is no because 
one needs a large number of participants: on the one hand, merchants must invest to be 
equipped with special POS terminals in order to accept payments with e-money12. On the 
other hand, consumers must use e-money in its various forms for retail transactions as a 
substitute for banknotes and coins. The essence of the problem is thus to convince a large 
number of users to adopt e-money innovations.
One reason why it is difficult for people to use a new payment instrument that has 
not been highlighted in the literature is the ingrained habit of using cash and cheques for 
retail transactions. For instance, in some countries such as France, payment with cheq-
ues has over the years become a part of the cultural heritage. As a result, changing the 
habit of paying with cheques is very difficult. More generally, the habit of the presence 
of a middleman, called banks, for each transaction may also be a reason for the slow im-
plementation of e-money since this latter does not necessitate any intermediary. People 
have longed trusted these financial institutions and are not used to managing their money 
themselves13. Consequently, they are reluctant to carry out their transactions without the 
presence of theses intermediaries. A large number of people need an apprenticeship pro-
cess in order to familiarise themselves with new payment instruments. Most people in 
these circumstances adopt a wait and see attitude towards innovations such as e-money, 
they want to have more confidence and trust about such innovations before starting to use 
them. This habit persistence is perhaps an important reason why e-money is not actually 
in more widespread use14.
Habit persistence is not a new phenomenon. With many earlier significant innovati-
ons, it took many years before their economic impact and an expansion in their use could 
be observed. For example, only 5% of American companies and 3% of households used 
electric power in 1889, eight years after the first electric generator in New York was put 
11 A consumer’s benefits from having a new payment instrument depends on how many businesses will take it 
in payment. On the other hand, merchants and service providers will refuse to invest in the systems needed to accept 
the new payment instrument until they are sure that there will be enough consumer demand to justify the expense. 
See Osterberg and Thomson (1998) for more details.
12 Payment with e-money incurs two different costs for merchants: cost per transaction and cost per amount.
13 For example, by reloading money from the merchant special terminal POS without the obligation of passing 
by a bank or an ATM.
14 I thank an anonymous referee for this remark.305
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to use (David, 1994). Twenty years later, only 50% of factories used electricity in their 
production activities.
The spread of earlier payment innovations has also been slow. In 1995, only 15% 
of French citizens had a credit or a debit card; today, 89% have credit and debit and the 
number of users is still in growing. If one compares the current situation to these histori-
cal experiences, one could conclude that we may have to wait for a while to see the effects 
of a more widespread use of e-money innovations. One reason why the use of e-money 
could spread faster than in the past in the future is that the habit persistence problem can 
be more easily overcome in a knowledge-based, digital economy and society. The cas-
hless society might therefore not be far away from us.
4 Conclusion
Advances in information and communications technology have enabled the appea-
rance of new methods of electronic payment in the real world (card-based products) and 
the virtual world (software-card product). The reason for the spread of these products has 
been their greater effectiveness compared with the traditional payment systems. Howe-
ver, statistics on payment systems indicate that electronic money development is still at 
an early stage of development and that cash continues to be the most important means of 
payment for retail transactions. Thus, contrary to some early expectations, cash has not 
been yet replaced by electronic money.
This paper has tried to explain why electronic money has been not been in widespre-
ad use so far. One reason is that e-money is a fairly sophisticated form of money: its use 
requires investment in new payment technology by the retailers, and investment in the 
acquisition of new skills by the consumers. This paper has highlighted two additional re-
asons. The first is network externalities: as in the case of other innovations, the number 
of users of electronic money needs to attain a certain critical mass in order for a breakt-
hrough in its usage to be achieved. The second problem hindering more widespread use 
of electronic money is the persistence of habit in using traditional forms of payment such 
as cash and cheques. If this habit persistence changed, it might become easier to attain the 
critical size of the network necessary for the spread of electronic money. 
Governments could play a potentially significant role in changing the habit persi-
stence problem and thus promoting the use of e-money. For instance, by encouraging 
the use of e-money in small transactions such as public parking meters and public tran-
sportation services, they could significantly increase the number of users of electronic 
forms of payment, helping to achieve the critical mass of users necessary to trigger ne-
twork effects.
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